I’ve been sitting around the city government office lately, trying to figure out what to do with all the ingratiation I’ve been doing (I started a little twice-a-week English conversation hour at the request of the section head and now I’m everyone’s favorite American). I haven’t written any stories about the city government because it is, naturally, not nearly as exciting as karaoke and ghosts and so on (or at least the parts of it that I see aren’t). But that there also is a way of life, at least for those people for most of their day. So although I find big offices deadening and fall asleep in meetings (and have determined that my next ethnography will be some situation in which I am exposed to neither), I think I should try to write about stuff that goes on there too.
So for instance, a meeting the other day. Protagonists: the presenter, a chubby man with a Ben Franklin haircut, who is a partner in a private urban planning and design firm; our section leader. Auxiliaries: a co-worker in our section; the presenter’s silent partner; a guy my age responsible for pushing the button that moves the PowerPoint presentation from slide to slide; and me. The city government is trying to get its hands on a piece of land right in the heart of Taipei that has been occupied by a military installation and off-limits both to the public and to the city government itself. The military offices are being moved elsewhere, and it’s unclear who will get the land and the buildings currently on it. The land is technically nationalized, being a military installation, but now that it won’t actually be used by the military there is some chance that the city government can make a strong enough case for it to be given to them. It doesn’t seem like a very good chance—it’s prime real estate, and the city mayor is KMT, which not the president’s party—but I guess they figure it’s worth at least presenting a proposal, which is where the planning and design firm comes in.
We’ve already determined that we would like the space to be used as an “international cultural exchange center” (that’s a translation). We don’t, however, know exactly what that would entail. In fact, we have no idea what we mean by it. From what I can tell, someone came up with this name in a meeting a few months ago, and everyone figured that it sounded like it fit in well with the general city government policy of promoting Taipei as an “international city” at every turn, as well as with a pan-government policy of desperately, if not always efficiently, trying to create international ties wherever and however they can (for obvious reasons). So where the planning and design firm comes in is to figure out for us, over the course of several months and at the cost of several thousands of dollars, what we might mean by this title, and then to write it up in a proposal that can be presented to the central government. As the section head explains about half-way through the meeting: “We’ve already decided we want to use this space; what you need to give us is the reason.”
The presenter starts out his presentation as follows: “The self (自我, ziwo, ego). From the Republic of China government on down to the Taipei City government, nobody knows what the self is.” I am sure that many philosophers, psychologists, and anthropologists would agree with this assessment. His point, as I understood it, was, however, not that we need to read more Mead, but that governmental agencies at all levels in Taiwan have failed to come up with a concise, coherent formulation of identity in terms of which their projects can be justified and their realities explained and assessed. With dramatic PowerPoints, he then presented his case, something like this:
Taiwan has been integrated into the global economic system, but it is losing its grip there as mainland China comes to substitute as the provider of a variety of goods that used to come from Taiwan; even Taiwanese businesses are moving to the mainland in large numbers, and don’t think that silicon valley even thinks about Taiwan anymore. Moreover, given current worldwide concerns about terrorism and the uncertain future of America’s war on terror, not to mention the increasingly tight alliance between the US and PRC governments that it has given rise to, the future economic and diplomatic distribution of power is even more uncertain. In fact, we don’t even know the present distribution of economic power, as the latest figures comparing Taipei and Shanghai markets, and detailing Taiwanese businesses in the mainland, have yet to come out, or at least we haven’t been able to gather the relevant information. In short, the future is highly uncertain, and it is still unclear what the best direction for Taipei to go in is. We need to do more research, figure out the Shanghai situation, and get an overall grasp on where the money is really going. At present we just can’t know.
Okay, so, I’m sorry to subject you to this—surely you have read at least one page worth of stuff on globalization in your life, and you may have also read maybe a newspaper article or two that mentioned Taiwan, so there would have been no new information for you in this presentation. You’ll notice, also, that there was nothing in the presentation about how and why a military installation might be converted into an international cultural exchange center, or what an international cultural exchange center might actually do. I’ve never worked in a government office outside of Taiwan, but I assume that the general form of this approach—what people here sometimes term “overly idealistic (過度理想 guodu lixiang),” but which I was taught by less polite people on the mainland to call “garbage-speak (廢話feihua)”—is in some sense universal (cf things like plans to spread democracy and liberty all over the world). Still, its contents are surely culturally specific and reveal something about the particular concerns of the Taiwanese people, as well as about the specific internal workings of the Taiwanese state. Right? Or else why am I sitting there listening to this when I could be out eating mango ice (they’re just about out of season) and listening to Taiwanese pop?
This presentation reminded me of something I saw on TV the fall I first got here. There were city council elections that winter (there are always some sort of elections going on, for reasons that I am too hungry to go into right now), and some TV station was giving spots to the candidates to air their political platforms. I happened to catch one candidate explaining his political platform. If elected to the Taipei city council, he would make Taiwan the fifty-first state of the United States of America. You might ask him, he continued, “Is this plan really implementable (可行不可行kexing bu kexing)?” And he’d tell you: “Kexing, it is implementable.” Why? “Because the Chinese people in Taiwan want it; and the Chinese people in America, also want it!”
[1]
So what does it mean for Taipei to define its ziwo, its self? Where would such a definition come from? How about New York? In the late 1970s, the Taipei city government hired a university research team to devise a set of zoning ordinances for the city. Taipei had already had some differentiated land-use rules since the Japanese colonial period (I currently don’t know anything about these but I will at some point, once I’ve read a couple of books that I now, finally, at least possess). This type of zoning was relatively general, it was horizontal but not vertical (that is, it designated certain geographic spaces as district-types but did not address the question of mixed use in a multi-story building), and it consisted of prohibitions on certain types of use in certain places, rather than a positive listing of the uses allowed in a given place.
I had a chat about this with someone who’s had a lot of experience in the city government and so must have a very good sense of how things work and where impetus comes from, but who talks, regardless of topic or venue, like she’s reciting a fairy tale. I had to interpret for her once when there was a foreign visitor and found it quite taxing in the same way as much of the rest of my translating work for the city government is taxing: for some reason it’s particularly difficult to translate things when they have no content. As a dedicated and responsible worker, I have to constantly ask myself, “What is the most appropriate way to convey in English the exact level of vagueness, the utter vacuity, of this statement?” So when I ask this person why zoning legislation was introduced in Taipei in 1983—what were the factors motivating the writing of these new laws—it is perfectly okay for her to answer, “[It was] felt that zones ought to be demarcated more clearly.” Like talking to someone’s grandmother about her garden.
In the kind of
Lobachevskian move that is typical of law formation in Taiwan, the zoning laws were created “in consultation with,” that is “by copying from,” the zoning laws of New York City. But, there are some problems with implementation. “Although we’d like to separate residential, commercial, and industrial districts more clearly like in Euro-America or Japan, it’s not like that. We’d like to arrange it so that there would be stores on the street but not in the alleyways; but when we go into an alley, hey, there’s stores there, on the first floor, on the second floor—we can’t really see any zone differentiation. This is because in earlier days, our custom was to have commerce and residence all together: on the bottom floor, there’s a store, and behind it or on the floor above, the residence. These few decades, these few centuries, that’s been our custom; it’s unchangeable. It turns out that if there is, say, a restaurant next door or a store above us, we’re actually likely to feel that it is very convenient, rather than be upset about the noise that it causes. So really, we have not been able to enforce these regulations.”
This fact—that Taiwanese laws tend to be imported from other places rather than based on realistic assessments of Taiwanese society, and therefore tend to be unenforceable—is the thesis of a really great essay by Jane Winn.
[2] I was kind of surprised to have a government administrator tell me the same thing, though, and in a way that did not seem to suggest that the implementation of the laws might raise questions about either the process of their development or their aims. I recounted this conversation to a friend here who has lived in America. I’m not sure if he found the situation as funny as I did, but he smiled, thought a while, and then commented, “Well at least they chose New York—imagine if they had copied the laws from Chicago!” Chicago being, I guess, about the least convenient, least happening, least-like-Taipei place he could think of.
[1] The phrase he used for “Chinese people” was Huaren華人, which is the most ethnic, least national, way to put it—it’s a good way of getting around things like arguing about whether the people who live on Taiwan are “Taiwanese” (Taiwanren台灣人) or “Chinese” (Zhongguoren中國人); whether there are differences between the “Taiwanese” (benshengren, 本省人, ‘this province people’) and the “mainlanders” (waishengren, 外省人, other province people) living on Taiwan, and whether there are differences between the people living on Taiwan and those living on the mainland. Huaren is something I think most people accept themselves as being, regardless of their political position.
[2] Winn, Jane Kaufman. 1994. "Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law: Informal Financial Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan." Law & Society Review 28, 2:193-232.